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1 Introduction
Output quotas are known to be more eﬃcient than input quotas in transferring
surplus from consumers to producers. While both types of quotas entail a
consumer loss arising from the increase in output price, an input quota also raises
the shadow price of the restricted input and leads to ineﬃcient production. As
noted by Alston and James (2002), under an input quota, producers will distort
the input mix to make the constraint on input use less binding. In the case
of acreage restrictions, this distortion may lead to intensiﬁed use of non-land
inputs, a phenomenon referred to as “slippage”. Alston and James (2002) also
mention that with inputs of varying quality, input quotas give producers an
incentive to use the highest quality of the restricted input.
Floyd (1965) has studied the redistributive properties of alternative agricul-
tural policies with an application to U.S. agriculture. Specifying a constant-
elasticity partial equilibrium model with two inputs (land and an aggregate
input representing labor and non-land capital) and one output, he compared
the returns to these two inputs of an output subsidy scheme, a land quota
scheme and an output quota scheme that have the same eﬀect on output price.
He did not compare those three policies in terms of their economy-wide dead-
weight losses. Using an equilibrium displacement model with constant-elasticity
demand and supply schedules, Gardner (1987) has analyzed the welfare eﬀects
of output and input quotas. He showed that the surplus transformation curve
for an input quota lies inside that for an output quota, meaning that the surplus
transfer from consumers to producers is less eﬃcient. He also noted that in the
extreme case where the elasticity of substitution between inputs is zero, the two
curves should coincide.
Despite their theoretical ineﬃciency, input quotas have been a ubiquitous
element of agricultural policies, a common example being acreage reduction pro-3
grams. Well-known land quota policies include the former US tobacco program,
the former US acreage reduction program (repealed by the 1996 FAIR Act)
or the EU wine common market organization rules. It has been argued that
output quotas cannot be properly implemented when output heavily depends
on weather conditions (Gisser, 1993; Alston and James, 2002). Output quotas
may also be diﬃcult to implement if the raw farm output is directly sold to
consumers, as noted by Alston and James (2002) for the case of the Canadian
and Australian egg industries.
While practicality considerations pertaining to the implementation and mon-
itoring of quotas may partially explain the existence of input quotas, I argue in
what follows that policymakers may also have eﬃciency reasons to choose them.
The widely accepted view that input quotas create additional deadweight losses
heavily rests on comparisons that take for granted that the regulator can per-
fectly (and at no cost) choose and monitor the quota level that transfers any
given amount of surplus from consumers to producers. I show that relaxing this
assumption may lead the regulator to prefer an input quota policy.
In the next section, I derive the welfare eﬀects of an output quota and an
input quota in the context of a 2-input, 1-output industry, and present numerical
evidence of the relative ineﬃciency of input quotas, based on the assumption
that the regulator has perfect information about the market fundamentals and
can enforce the quota level at no cost. In section 3, I analytically derive the
optimal quota levels from the point of view of the production sector under two
alternative scenarios, and show that letting the industry choose its quota level
always leads to a smaller deadweight loss under an input quota policy. Section
4 concludes.4
2 Welfare eﬀects of output and input quotas
Alston and James (2002) have suggested the use of a Muth model (Muth, 1964)
in order to quantify the ineﬃciency of input quotas. Accordingly, I specify a
Muth model with 2 inputs (X1 and X2) and 1 output (Q). The assumptions un-
derlying the model are that the production technology displays constant returns
to scale, and that the production sector is perfectly competitive. In addition, I
will assume throughout the paper that whenever quotas are implemented, they
are fully transferable.1
I specify the model as follows:

              
              
E(Q) = −ηE(P) − δQ
E(P) = s1E(W1) + s2E(W2)
E(X1) = −s2σE(W1) + s2σE(W2) + E(Q)
E(X2) = s1σE(W1) − s1σE(W2) + E(Q)
E(X1) = 1E(W1) − δ1
E(X2) = 2E(W2)
, (1)
where P, W1 and W2 are the prices of output Q and inputs X1 and X2, s1 and
s2 denote the cost shares on inputs X1 and X2, η denotes the absolute value
of the elasticity of output demand, 1 and 2 denote the elasticity of supply
of inputs X1 and X2, σ denotes the elasticity of input substitution, and E(.)
denotes the percentage change in an equilibrium variable.2 The perturbation
δQ represents a relative shift of the output demand schedule along the quantity
axis. Similarly, δ1 represents a relative shift of the supply schedule of input X1
along the quantity axis.
1Although this assumption is not realistic for most agricultural quotas, I am not inter-
ested in modeling ineﬃciencies arising from misallocation of quotas between heterogeneous
producers.
2All elasticities are evaluated at the undistorted equilibrium.5
2.1 Welfare eﬀects of an output quota
The system of equations (1) can be solved to express the relative changes in
equilibrium variables due to the perturbations δQ and δ1. To analyze the eﬀect
of an output quota, I set δ1 = 0 and let η → ∞. The exogenous relative decrease
in output is then represented by parameter δQ, and the relative changes in X1,
X2, W1 and W2, can be expressed as functions of δQ. To calculate the change in
output price, I let η take on its real value and use the fact that E(P) = −1
ηE(Q).
The changes in equilibrium prices and quantities can then be used to derive the
following welfare eﬀects:3

       
       



































where D0 = σ(s11 +s22)+12 > 0, QR represents the quota rent, and ∆CS,
∆PS1 and ∆PS2 are the changes in consumer surplus and the quasi-rents to
suppliers of inputs X1 and X2, respectively. The resulting deadweight loss for
the economy, deﬁned as the sum of those surplus changes, is:
DWLo = −PQ
1
2ηD02[D02 − s11η(σ + 2)2 − s22η(σ + 1)2
+2η(σ + s21 + s12)D0]δQ
2. (2)
It is easy to show that DWLo is always negative. It is proportional to δQ
2,
which implies that a marginal output quota, in the absence of any preexisting
distortion, will entail no deadweight loss, a well-known result in public ﬁnance.
3All derivations and proofs are available from the author upon request.6
2.2 Welfare eﬀects of an input quota
The eﬀect of an input quota can be inferred by setting δQ = 0 and letting
1 → ∞. The relative reduction in input X1 is then represented by parameter
δ1, and the relative changes in X2, W2, Q and P can be expressed as functions
of δ1. The change in W1 is calculated using the fact that E(W1) = 1
1E(X1),
with 1 now denoting the real elasticity of input supply. The welfare eﬀects of
the input quota can then be derived as:

       
       


































where D00 = ησ + (s1η + s2σ)2 > 0. The corresponding deadweight loss is:
DWLi = −PQ
s1
21D002[D002 − s11η(σ + 2)2 − s1s212(σ − η)2
+2(s1σ + s2η + 2)1D00]δ1
2. (3)
It can easily be shown that DWLi is always negative. It is proportional to
δ1
2, which implies that a marginal quota on input X1, in the absence of any
preexisting distortion, will entail no deadweight loss. This ﬁnding generalizes
the public ﬁnance result that marginal quotas do not create deadweight losses
to the case of an input quota in a multi-product setting.
Expressions (2) and (3) can be used to compare the deadweight losses from
an input quota and an output quota. Figure 1 represents the deadweight losses
of output and input quota policies, as functions of the transfer to the production
sector. The transfer is deﬁned as the sum of the quota rent and the quasi-rents
to suppliers of inputs X1 and X2. The fact that the curve for the input quota7
lies inside that for the output quota implies that the input quota policy is less
eﬃcient, because for any given transfer of surplus to producers, the social cost
of the transfer will be larger for the input quota. Although the two curves
were derived for a given set of parameter values, changing these values does not
modify the overall shape of the curves or their relative position. Making the
elasticity of substitution smaller brings the two curves closer to one another,
though even for small values of σ they can be made further apart by decreasing
s1. Note that because the input quota is less eﬃcient, there exists a set of
transfers that are achievable through an output quota but not through an input
quota. For the case shown in ﬁgure 1, surplus transfers ranging approximately
from 20 to 35% of the value of output are only attainable through an output
quota.
Table 1 shows the deadweight losses associated with the transfer of a given
amount of surplus to the production sector, for an output and an input quota
and for various parameter settings. As noted above, although the input quota
is always less eﬃcient, the two policies converge for small enough values of σ or
large enough values of s1.
3 Optimal output and input quotas
In this section, I assume that the regulator, instead of choosing the quota level
itself, chooses which type of quota to implement (output or input quota) but
lets the industry choose and monitor the quota level. I carry out this analysis
under two scenarios, reﬂecting two levels of representation of the suppliers of
input X2 in the industry. First, I assume that the quota is chosen so as to
maximize the sum of the rents to suppliers of both inputs. Then, I assume it
is chosen so as to maximize the rents to suppliers of input X1 only. In both
scenarios, I assume that the quota rent accrues to the suppliers of X1.8
3.1 Scenario 1
Under this scenario, suppliers of input X1 and X2 are equally represented in the
industry. This is the case, in particular, if one entity supplies both inputs and
produces the output. A farm sector where farmers supply family labor and own
farm land would satisfy this assumption (neglecting other agricultural inputs).
The optimal output quota δQ
∗ chosen by the industry then solves
max
δQ
TR + ∆PS1 + ∆PS2.




2D0D − s11η(σ + 2)2 − s22η(σ + 1)2, (4)
where D = σ(η + s11 + s22) + η(s21 + s12) + 12 > 0.
Similarly, the optimal input quota δ1




D00(D + (s1σ + s2η + 2)1) − s1s2(σ − η)212
. (5)
Plugging expressions (4) and (5) into expressions (2) and (3), respectively,
it can be shown that the deadweight loss resulting from the optimal output
quota is always larger than that resulting from the optimal input quota.4 For
tractability purposes, I present a proof of this result in the special case where
1 → ∞ and 2 → ∞, that is, when the gain to producers is only comprised of













4This result was shown, in the general case, with the aid of the “Simplify” command in
MATHEMATICA. The proof is available upon request.9
so that |DWLi(δ1
∗)| < |DWLo(δQ
∗)| iﬀ s1η(s1η +2s2σ) < (s1η +s2σ)2, which
is always true. As a result, the deadweight loss generated by an input quota
policy where producers freely choose the quota level is always smaller than that
generated by an output quota policy where producers freely choose the quota
level. This can be seen in ﬁgure 1, where the deadweight loss corresponding to
the largest attainable transfer is clearly smaller for the input quota.
This result is far from being obvious. Even if one expects the output price
to be lower under an optimal input quota policy (because the production ineﬃ-
ciency deters the producer group from distorting output too much), which would
make consumers better oﬀ, the surplus transferred to producers is necessarily
smaller under an input quota because of the waste due to ineﬃcient production.
Therefore, it would have been hard to predict that the resulting deadweight loss
was lower for an input quota policy. In fact, the production ineﬃciency has
two opposing eﬀects on this deadweight loss: it creates waste because produc-
ers depart from cost-minimizing behavior, but at the same time it restricts the
ability of the industry to eﬀectively increase output price, therefore beneﬁting
consumers. The above derivation shows that the latter eﬀect dominates.
3.2 Scenario 2
Under this scenario, suppliers of input X2 are not represented in the industry.
This would be the case if landowners (suppliers of land) and farm managers
(owners of the output quotas) are equally represented in the industry, but sup-
pliers of hired labor (input X2) are not. In this situation, the group comprised
of landowners and farm managers collects the quota rents, while farm workers
are hurt by an output quota and either beneﬁt or lose from an input quota,
depending on the relative magnitudes of σ and η.5
5More precisely, farm workers beneﬁt from an input quota iﬀ σ > η, i.e., inputs are gross
substitutes.10
The optimal output quota ˆ δQ then maximizes TR + ∆PS1 and is equal to
ˆ δQ =
(D0 + s2η(σ + 1))D0
2D0D − s11η(σ + 2)2. (6)
Similarly, the optimal input quota ˆ δ1 is given by
ˆ δ1 =
(s1σ + s2η + 2)1D00
D00(D + (s1σ + s2η + 2)1)
. (7)
As for scenario 1, it can be shown that the deadweight loss generated by
the optimal input quota is always smaller than that generated by the optimal
output quota.
3.3 Robustness check
The results presented in the last two sections were derived assuming that changes
in equilibrium prices and quantities can be approximated using a ﬁrst-order ap-
proximation around the undistorted equilibrium. Although this approximation
will be exact for linear demand and input supply schedules, its accuracy may be-
come questionable for other speciﬁcations, especially for large departures from
the undistorted equilibrium. Since I am interested in comparing the deadweight
losses of quotas that are by nature far from the undistorted quantities, it is
relevant to ask whether the result would hold with other model speciﬁcations.
In the following, I derive the deadweight losses from optimal quotas using
constant-elasticity demand and supply schedules, and a Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion technology.6 In order to simplify the analysis, I assume that the supply
of input X2 is inﬁnitely elastic, at price w2. Hence, industry proﬁts are equal
to the quasi-rent of suppliers of input X1 plus the quota rent. Using the same
6Note that the Cobb-Douglas assumption implies that the elasticity of substitution between
inputs, σ, is constant and equal to 1.11
notation as before, the model equations read:

    






























From expressions (8) and (9), it is apparent that the industry’s derived supply
and demand schedules are of the constant-elasticity form. It is then straightfor-
ward to derive the proﬁt-maximizing output and input quota levels, using the
monopolist’s pricing rule stating that the relative price-cost margin must equal


















Gardner (1987) derives an expression for the deadweight loss resulting from
a given reduction in quantity, for the constant-elasticity case. Applying this
7Q∗ denotes the monopoly quantity and Q the undistorted quantity.12

















































Although an analytical demonstration that |DWLo| > |DWLi| would be beyond
the scope of this paper, it can easily be checked through simulation that the
result still holds. Table 2 compares these two measures for a wide range of
parameter values.8 Without constituting by itself an irrefutable proof of the
robustness of the deadweight loss comparison, this derivation adds credence to
the view that it should be valid in many situations.
4 Interpretation
Let us summarize the results derived in sections 2 and 3. The regulator will
prefer an output quota policy if he solves
min
P,λ
DWL(P(λ)) sub. to T(P(λ)) ≥ τ,
where P represents the policy choice (an output or input quota policy), λ rep-
resents the quota level, T represents the realized transfer to producers and τ is





Q , meaning that the optimal reduction in input use is
smaller than the optimal reduction in output.13












In this case, the regulator chooses the policy but lets the industry regulate itself
in its choice and implementation of the quota level. This program assumes that
the objective τ is achievable through both policy alternatives. This clearly puts
an upper bound on the value of τ, as we saw in section 2 that large transfers
can only be achieved through output quotas.
This provides a new argument as to why policymakers may favor input quo-
tas over output quotas. The superiority of output quotas over input quotas, as
described in section 2, is dependent upon the assumptions that the regulator
either seeks to increase output price by a given amount or to transfer a given
amount of surplus to producers, and that he knows which quota level to imple-
ment in order to achieve either of these objectives. It also assumes implicitly
that the cost of enforcing the quota is negligible.9
However, the regulator rarely has perfect information about the market fun-
damentals, i.e., the supply and demand elasticities. Producers may have a better
knowledge of their cost and demand conditions than regulators. The producer
association has no incentive to reveal these elements to the regulator, but rather
to lie about them so that the regulator ends up choosing the quota level that
maximizes producers’ surplus. Even if the regulator could design a revelation
mechanism that would lead the industry to truthfully reveal its cost, this mech-
anism would certainly generate information rents for the producer association,
and thus the regulator would only be able to obtain the desired information at
9Here, enforcement costs are the costs the regulator incurs when ensuring that producers
do not restrict input or output below the regulated quota level. Those must be distinguished
from the costs of ensuring that each producer does not exceed its allocated quota.14
a positive cost. Even though the design of such a revelation mechanism lies be-
yond the scope of the present paper, it is not unreasonable to think that the cost
of obtaining information from the producer group would be larger the larger the
amount of surplus at stake for the industry. Since the optimal transfer is always
larger for an output quota, the industry would lose more by revealing its cost
under an output quota policy than under an input quota policy. Therefore, if
the regulator chose to implement an output quota, it would probably cost him
more to obtain truthful information from the industry. This information rent
could potentially reverse the ranking of the two policies.
Sometimes, although the type of quota is given and not negotiable (it could
be set up in the legislation), the quota level itself is revised annually through
an administrative procedure that involves the producer association. In some
French cheese markets for instance, quota levels are adopted upon proposition
by the producer association (Conseil de la Concurrence, 1998). In such cases,
it is not unreasonable to think that the quota level adopted will be close to the
one maximizing industry proﬁts. The results from section 3 then indicate that
the deadweight loss is likely to be smaller for an input quota policy.
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Figure 1: Deadweight losses of output and input quota policies as functions of
the transfer to the production sector. The baseline parameter values are η = 0.5,
1 = 0.5, 2 = 1, s1 = 0.6 and σ = 0.5.16
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
η 1 2 s1 s2 σ T |DWLo| |DWLi|
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.005 0.014
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.001 0.004
1.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.02* 0.001 0.004
1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.003 0.008
1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.02* 0.001 0.007
1 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.004 0.011
1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.012 0.023
1 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.02* 0.001 0.006
1 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.05 0.005 0.005
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.05 0.005 0.008
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.05 0.005 0.005
1 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.95 0.01 0.05 0.005 0.014
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.05 0.005 0.017
Table 1: Deadweight losses of output and input quota policies. Column 7
indicates the surplus transfer to producers in terms of the value of output. Stars
identify situations where a transfer of 5% was achievable through an output
quota, but not an input quota. Columns 8 and 9 show the deadweight loss of
the transfer for the output and input quota policies, respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9








1.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.05 0.182 0.357 0.962 0.344
1.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.25 0.390 0.563 0.304 0.135
2.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.75 0.567 0.719 0.099 0.049
1.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 1.05 0.253 0.757 0.792 0.095
1.1 1 0.5 0.5 1.05 0.145 0.210 1.077 0.513
1.5 0.1 0.5 0.5 1.25 0.481 0.862 0.247 0.037
1.5 1 0.5 0.5 1.25 0.333 0.409 0.343 0.201
1.1 0.5 0.9 0.1 1.09 0.370 0.425 0.585 0.466
1.1 0.5 0.1 0.9 1.01 0.087 0.214 1.327 0.120
Table 2: Optimal output and input quotas and corresponding deadweight losses
in the constant-elasticity case. Note that for the monopoly solution to be de-
ﬁned, demand elasticities have to be greater than 1 in absolute value. The
elasticity of the derived demand for input X1 is reported in column 5.